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Abstract 
 
  The rising government debt levels in the aftermath of global financial crisis 
and the ongoing euro zone debt crisis have necessitated the revival of the academic and 
policy debate on the impact of growing debt levels on growth. This study provides a 
data–rich analysis of the dynamics of government debt and economic growth for a 
longer period (1960–2009). It spans across different debt regimes and involves a 
worldwide sample of countries that is more representative than that of studies confined 
to advanced countries. This study observes a negative relationship between government 
debt and growth. The point estimates of the range of econometric specifications suggest 
a 10-percentage point increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio is associated with 23 basis 
point reduction in average growth. Our results establish the nonlinear relationship 
between debt and growth. Further, by employing panel vector auto regressions (PVAR) 
approach, this study decomposes the cause and effect relationship between debt and 
growth and offers an answer to the question – Does high debt lead to low growth or low 
growth leads to high debt? The results derived from the impulse–response functions 
and variance decomposition show the evidence of long-term effect of debt on economic 
growth. The results indicate that the effect is not uniform for all countries, but depends 
mostly on the debt regimes and other important macroeconomic variables like; 
inflation, trade openness, general government final consumption expenditure and 
foreign direct investment.  
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1. Introduction 
 Post-global financial crisis, the debt trajectories in several economies around the world 
are felt to be unsustainable. Many countries in the euro zone (and more particularly Greece) 
are struggling with a combination of high levels of indebtedness, budget deficits and frail 
growth. This has necessitated the revival of the academic and policy debate on the impact of 
rising levels of government debt on economic growth. There is a growing concern among the 
policymakers, central banks, and international policy organizations to understand the effects 
of government debt on economic growth. An important policy question in this context has 
been – ‘Do sovereign countries with high government debt tend to grow slowly?’ 
 
 Reinhart and Rogoff (RR), in some of their influential articles, argue that higher levels 
of government debt are negatively correlated with economic growth, but there is no link 
between debt and growth when government debt is below 90% of GDP (Reinhart and Rogoff, 
2010a; Reinhart, Reinhart and Rogoff 2012). RR’s findings have sparked a new literature 
seeking to assess whether their results were robust to allow for non-arbitrary debt brackets, 
control variables in a multivariate regression setup, reverse causality, and cross-country 
heterogeneity. After the publication of the (critique) article by Herndon, Ash, and Pollin 
(2014) challenging some of RR’s findings, the discussion on the relationship between debt 
and growth in advanced economies has become more animated. Krugman (2010), citing the 
case of Japan, argues that the link between debt and growth could be driven by the fact that it 
is low economic growth that leads to high levels of government debt. This argument needs an 
empirical investigation. 
 
 The evolving empirical literature reveals a negative correlation between government 
debt and economic growth. This correlation becomes particularly strong when government 
debt approaches 100% of GDP (Reinhart and Rogoff 2010a; 2010b; Kumar and Woo 2010; 
Cecchetti et al. 2011). Empirical research, of late, has begun to focus on possibilities of non-
linearities within the debt-growth nexus, with specific attention to high government debt 
levels. The empirical literature on this issue remains sparse as very few studies employ non-
linear impact analysis
1
 and does not provide an examination of the cause-effect relationship 
to reveal the government debt-economic growth nexus. 
 
                                                          
1 Chang and Chiang (2009) and Cecchetti et al., (2011) employ non-linear panel threshold approach for non-dynamic panels. 
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 We notice three inadequacies in the empirical literature on debt–growth nexus. First, 
there is a need to expand the horizon of the data sample, as averaging across OECD / 
advanced countries alone would make such inferences difficult. Second,  we do not find 
studies emphasising the need for establishing the presence of a causal link going from debt to 
growth and finding what economists call an ‘instrumental variable’. Third, we do not find 
studies that decompose the cause–effect relationship between government debt and economic 
growth. 
 
 This study endeavours to fill the above research gap by providing a sound empirical 
investigation based on well–established theoretical considerations. We first examine the 
debt–growth nexus, and then employing panel vector auto regression analysis, provide 
solution to the question – Does high debt lead to low growth or low growth leads to high 
debt? This study is unique as it overcomes the issues related to data adequacy, coverage of 
countries, heterogeneity, endogeneity, and non–linearities. We contribute to the current strand 
of literature on government debt and economic growth by extending the horizon of analysis 
by exploring a considerably large worldwide sample covering 122 countries. We provide a 
thorough econometric analysis that allows non–linearity estimation. Our data–intensive 
approach offers stylized facts, which is well beyond selective anecdotal evidence. This paper 
makes a distinct contribution to the debate by offering new empirical evidence based on a 
sizeable dataset. 
 
 The paper is organised as follows. We present our data in section 2. We provide in 
section 3, a detailed econometric analysis of the government debt–economic growth 
relationship. Section 4 describes the vector auto regression analysis to know whether debt 
causes growth or vice versa. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Data 
 Our dataset explores annual macroeconomic data on 252 countries, over the period 
1960–2009. To maintain homogeneity, as it is for a large sample of countries over the course 
of five decades, we employ a primarily source – World Development Indicators (WDI) 
database 2014 of World Bank. We strengthen our data with the use of supplementary data 
sourced from International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook 2014 database, 
International Financial Statistics and data files, and Reinhart and Rogoff dataset on debt–to–
GDP ratios. 
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 We group our sample countries into five debt regimes: 0–30%, 31–60%, 61–90%, 91–
150%, and >151% comparable to RR groupings based on the average debt/GDP levels 
(Table 1). We place each of the 252 countries in the WDI list into its relevant category of 
debt regime. However, each country’s entry into the group is dependent on the data 
adequacy. Exclusion of any country of the WDI list from our sampling is solely due to data 
considerations (either non–availability or inadequacy of data). The list of countries covered in 
the analysis is provided in annexure 1.  
 
 Table 1: Sample description for debt regimes 
Panel A: Sample frame for debt regimes 
Period DR 0–30% 
DR 31–
60% 
DR 61–90% DR 91 & above DR 151 & above Total 
1960–
2009 
29 56 18 14 5 122 
1970-2009 32 52 20 14 4 122 
1980-2009 24 53 24 16 5 122 
1990-2009 24 51 24 18 5 122 
2000-2009 24 45 20 13 5 107 
Panel B: Government Debt and GDP Growth in debt regimes  
Countries observations Debt Regime 
GDP Growth Government Debt 
Mean Median Mean Median 
8 160 0-30% 5.06% 4.83% 27.15 27.79 
31 620 31-60% 3.79% 3.68% 58.29 45.00 
20 400 61-90% 2.71% 2.70% 80.08 82.87 
13 260 91-150% 1.86% 1.88% 115.50 116.51 
4 80 >151% -1.08% -1.32% 176.75 160.99 
Total=76 1520 
     
 
Subsampling 
 We explore the dimension of historical specificity by examining real GDP growth by 
government debt category for subsampled periods of the data: 1960-2009, 1970-2009, 1980-
2009, 1990-2009, and 2000-2009. We do not extend our dataset beyond 2009, in view of the 
sudden and significant rise in government debt levels consequent to the government 
interventions in response to global financial crisis
2
.  
                                                          
2 In industrial countries, government debt has risen significantly. In 2009, the net sovereign borrowing needs of the United 
Kingdom and the United States were five times larger than the average of the preceding five years (2002–07). The huge 
stimulus and bailout package adopted by the US government to deal with the crisis delivered by irresponsible financial 
agents in 2009 took the net government debt to GDP ratio in the U.S. from 42.6 in 2007 to 72.4 percent in 2011. In advanced 
economies as a whole, government debt to GDP ratios are expected to reach 110 percent by 2015—an increase of almost 40 
percentage points over pre-crisis levels (IMF 2010). Many middle-income countries also witnessed a deterioration of their 
debt positions, although the trends are not as dramatic as those of advanced economies are. In low-income countries, in 
2009–10 the present value of the government debt to GDP ratio has deteriorated by 5–7 percentage points compared with 
pre-crisis projections (IDA and IMF 2010). 
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 The descriptive statistics of the sample presented in Table 1 suggest that countries in 
lower debt regime (0-30) have higher growth and the countries in highest debt regime (151 
and above) have lowest growth. We present in Figure 1, the interplay of government debt and 
growth. The first section of the figure illustrates the interaction of government debt with GDP 
growth in the sample for the period 1960-2009. We notice a declining growth as debt levels 
rise. The second section of the figure captures the interaction of debt and growth at the 
median points of debt. As debt surpasses the level of about 110 percent of GDP, the growth 
begins to decline swiftly and turns negative at the level of 210 percent of GDP. In the third 
section of the figure, we present the interaction of growth at ten–percent intervals of debt. 
Growth turns negative as debt moves beyond 210 percent of GDP. 
 
Figure 1: Government Debt and GDP growth 
This figure presents the dynamics of government debt and economic growth during 1960-2009 
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 We present the movement of GDP growth and debt in the panel data sample for the 
period 1960-2009 in Figure 2. The corresponding growth with the debt in the sample period 
indicates a negative correlation suggesting that as government debt rises, growth tends to 
decline. 
Figure 2: Movement of GDP growth and debt 
in the panel data sample during 1960-2009 
This figure illustrates the growth of government debt and corresponding GDP growth indicating 
the correlation that as debt increases GDP growth slides down over a period. 
 
 
 
 Figure 3 illustrates the trend of government debt in debt regimes (0-30; 31-60; 61-90; 
91-150; 151 and above). We notice a rising trend of debt with a median of 27.79 percent of 
GDP in DR 0-30. DR 31-60 exhibits a flat trend with a median debt at 45. A decreasing 
trend is noticed in DR 61-90 with the median level at 82.87. DR 91-150 has a declining 
trend with a median of 116.51. DR 151 & above displays the trend like an inverted crescent 
shape with a median debt of 161.     
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Figure 3: Government Debt in debt regimes 
This figure illustrates the trend of government debt in debt regimes (0-30; 31-60; 61-90; 91-150; 151 and above). 
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Variables 
We provide in Table 2 the description of variables and data sources. 
Table 2: Description of variables and data sources 
Variable Description 
adr  
Age dependency ratio (% of 
working–age population) 
Age dependency ratio is the ratio of dependents--people younger than 15 or 
older than 64--to the working-age population--those ages 15-64. Data are 
shown as the proportion of dependents per 100 working-age population. 
Source: World Development Indicators (WDI) 
fce  
Final consumption 
expenditure (% of GDP) 
Final consumption expenditure is the sum of household final consumption 
expenditure (private consumption) and general government final consumption 
expenditure (general government consumption). Source: WDI 
fdi  
Foreign direct investment,  
net inflows (% of GDP) 
Foreign direct investments are the net inflows of investment to acquire a 
lasting management interest (10 percent or more of voting stock) in an 
enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor.  
Source: WDI 
gdpgr (GDPgrowth) 
Real GDP growth (annual %) 
Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant 
local currency. Source: WDI 
gfc  
General government final 
consumption expenditure 
(annual % growth) 
Annual percentage growth of general government final consumption 
expenditure based on constant local currency. Source: WDI 
gfcf  
Gross fixed capital formation 
(annual % growth) 
Average annual growth of gross fixed capital formation based on constant 
local currency. Source: WDI 
ggd (debt) 
General government gross 
debt 
Gross debt consists of all liabilities that require payment or payments of 
interest and/or principal by the debtor to the creditor at a date or dates in the 
future. This includes debt liabilities in the form of SDRs, currency and deposits, 
debt securities, loans, insurance, pensions and standardized guarantee 
schemes, and other accounts payable.   
Source: World Economic Outlook (WEO) April 2012; Reinhart and Rogoff (RR) 
data set 
infl  
Inflation (annual %) 
Inflation as measured by the annual growth rate of the GDP implicit deflator 
shows the rate of price change in the economy as a whole. Source: WDI 
pg  
Population growth (annual %) 
Annual population growth rate for year t is the exponential rate of growth of 
midyear population from year t-1 to t, expressed as a percentage. Source: WDI 
rir 
Real interest rate (%) 
Real interest rate is the lending interest rate adjusted for inflation as 
measured by the GDP deflator.  
Source: WDI 
tgdp (openness) 
Trade (% of GDP) 
Trade is the sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured as a 
share of gross domestic product. Source: WDI 
ulf 
Unemployed labour force 
Unemployment, total (% of total labor force) (national estimate). 
Unemployment refers to the share of the labor force that is without work but 
available for and seeking employment. Definitions of labor force and 
unemployment differ by country. Source: WDI 
  
 
3. The debt – growth relationship 
 In economic theory, at moderate levels of government debt, following a typical 
Keynesian behaviour, fiscal policy may induce growth. The classical economic view argues 
that government debt (manifesting deficit financing) can induce growth by stimulating 
aggregate demand and output in the short run. Moderate levels of debt are found to have a 
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positive impact on economic growth through a range of channels: improved monetary policy, 
strengthened institutions, enhanced private savings, and deepened financial intermediation 
(Abbas and Christensen, 2007). Government debt could be used to smoothen distortionary 
taxation over time (Barro, 1979). Barro’s model predicts that debt responds to the temporary 
deviation in income or government expenditure and hence, in the absence of aggregate 
uncertainty, debt would be constant and equal to its ‘initial’ level. Expansionary fiscal 
policies that lead to debt accumulation are argued to have a positive effect on both short and 
long–term growth (DeLong and Summers, 2012). In a theoretical model integrating the 
government budget constraint and debt financing, Adam and Bevan (2005) find increase in 
growth during low debt levels as they observe interaction effects between deficits and debt 
stocks, with high debt stocks exacerbating the adverse consequence of high deficits. 
 
 Historically, the theoretical literature argues that growth models amplified with 
governments issuing debt to fund consumption or capital goods tend to exhibit a negative 
relationship between government debt and economic growth. Modigliani (1961) argues that 
government debt is a burden for the posterity that results in waning flow of income from a 
reduced stock of private capital. It is argued that government debt crowds out capital and 
leads to slowdown of output in the long–run (Elmendorf and Mankiw, 1999).  
 
 Both the neoclassical and endogenous growth models inform the negative effect of 
government debt on long–run growth. Government debt could have a substantial adverse 
effect on economic outcomes if it affects the productivity of public expenditures (Teles and 
Cesar Mussolini, 2014). Analyzing the impact of fiscal policy, proxied inter alia by the level 
of government debt, in endogenous growth models, Aizenman et al., (2007) find a negative 
relationship. While standard growth theory advocates that an increase in government debt 
(due to a fiscal deficit) leads to slower growth, the neoclassical growth theory suggests a 
temporary decline in growth along with the transition path to a new steady state. However, 
the endogenous growth theory suggests a permanent decline in growth as the debt increases 
(Saint–Paul, 1992). 
 
 Several studies report a negative non–linear correlation between government debt and 
economic growth in advanced and emerging market economies (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2010; 
Reinhart et al., 2012; Kumar and Woo, 2010; Cecchetti et al., 2011; Checherita–Westphal 
and Rother, 2012). There is growing evidence that government debt is negatively correlated 
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with economic growth, and very few studies make a strong case for a causal relationship 
going from debt to growth. Lof and Malinen (2014) using data on 20 developed countries, 
estimate panel vector auto regressions to analyze the relationship between government debt 
and economic growth and  find no evidence for a robust effect of debt on growth, even for 
higher levels of debt. However, they observe significant negative correlation due to reverse 
effect of growth on debt. This study intends to provide a thorough analysis based on a larger 
data set and further refining with the analyses of debt–growth nexus in debt regimes. 
 
3.1 Estimation Strategy 
 We embark on a multi–step approach to explore our secular dataset covering the period 
from 1960 to 2009 and thoroughly investigate the nexus between government debt and 
growth. We employ both the descriptive statistics approach (as relied by Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2010) in their influential paper) and econometric approach to illustrate the government debt 
and economic growth nexus. 
Testing the bivariate relationship 
 In our econometric approach to address the topic, we begin by probing the bivariate 
linear relationship between debt and growth with the following specification: 
 t
j
t
j
t debtGDPgrowth 
-------- Eqn (2) 
Where GDPgrowth
j
t
 is the annual GDP growth and debt
j
t
 is the outstanding gross 
government debt to GDP ratio for country ‘j’ in year‘t’. We estimate the Eqn (2) with a 
pooled panel and with country fixed effects. 
 
Testing the linear relationship 
 We probe the linear relationship with an empirical specification based on the empirical 
growth literature (e.g. Barro and Sala–i–Martin, 2004). We introduce other significant 
macroeconomic variables in order to account their simultaneity of impact. We are motivated 
by Islam (1995), in estimating our panel data growth regressions with country specific fixed 
effects and time–specific fixed effects, which allows us to estimate the impact of a change in 
any one factor on growth within a country in the data panel. 
 jttj
j
t
j
t
j
t
j
t
j
t
j
t
j
t
fdifcetgdpdebtGDPGDPgrowth   ),,,,( fcegfcf
j
t1
     
--- Eqn (3) 
 Where µj is country fixed effects; νt is time fixed effects; εjt is the error term. 
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The augmented Solow growth regression model 
 We extend our econometric specification using a Solow growth model. Following this 
model, our specification assumes that the structural growth for country ‘j’ conforms to a 
linear relationship over a period‘t’ and is common across the panel of countries.  
 jttj
j
t
j
t XGDPgrowth 

 
  jttj
j
tjS
j
t debtSGDPgrowth 
^
------- Eqn (4) 
 Where Sj is a vector of Solow regressors including gfcf, gfc, tgdp, fce, fdi, infl, lagged 
GDP, pg, and adr. It also includes the constant. µj is country–specific fixed effects; νt is 
time–fixed effects; εjt is the unobservable error term. Given the strong potential for 
endogeneity of the debt variable, we use instrumental variable (IV) estimation technique. In 
our instrumental variables model, we use Solow instruments in their lagged variables. As 
Easterly and Rebelo (1993) observe, one of the most likely sources of simultaneity is 
business cycle effects and hence the tendency of government expenditure is positively 
correlated with the level of GDP per capita. Many studies on growth regressions exploring 
panel data have made use of IV approach to deal with the issue of simultaneity bias Hiebert et 
al., (2002). With the use of GMM estimator, we seek to correct for the possible 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation in the error structure by using the consistent estimator. 
The two–step GMM provides some efficiency gains over the traditional IV/2–SLS estimator 
derived from the use of the optimal weighting matrix (Baum et al., 2013).  
 
Testing for nonlinearity 
In the debt–growth dynamics literature, the nonlinearity of the impact of debt on 
economic growth has been examined in different specifications. Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) 
use the correlations between debt and growth. On the other hand, Kumar and Woo (2012) and 
Egert (2015) study the relationship using the growth framework. While many empirical 
papers identify non–linearities in the relationship between debt and growth, very few studies 
make a clear theoretical argument for the presence of such non–linearities (Greiner, 2013).  
 
We investigate the nonlinearity of the debt–growth relationship (in view of the negative 
correlations at higher levels of debt with growth) by considering a specification that accounts 
for the polynomial trend of the debt variable. To introduce the smooth transition around a 
12 
 
turning point in debt level, we transform the Eqn (4) to formulate the following specification 
by introducing a square term of the debt to GDP ratio as an additional regressor: 
 
  jtt
j
j
tjS
j
t
j
tdebtdebtSGDPgrowth
 

2
^ ------- Eqn (5) 
 
Robustness checks 
In order to ensure that the outliers do not influence the results, we identify the outliers 
by drawing the scatterplot of the partial correlation between debt and growth obtained with 
the IV regression and estimate the models by dropping them. We also employ robust least 
squares (RLS) regression method designed to be less sensitive to outliers. We use M–
estimation method of RLS. Using the Huber–White sandwich correction, serially correlated 
residuals are dealt with in the context of the presence of within–country time dependence and 
heteroscedacity of unknown form. An alternative approach of using the Newey and West 
estimator (allow modeling the autocorrelation process in the error term) is also employed. 
The method of PCSEs (suggested by Beck and Katz) is very robust when there is little or no 
correlation between unit effects and explanatory variables. It is argued that its performance 
declines as the correlation strengthens. We use the fixed effects estimator with robust 
standard errors that appears to do better in these situations (Kristensen and Wawro, 2003). In 
addition, we test for the causality running from debt to growth employing Pairwise 
Demitrescu–Hurlin Panel Causality Tests. The results shown in Table 3 are significant and 
indicate causality running in both directions i.e. from debt to growth and growth to debt. 
 
Table 3: Results of Pairwise Demitrescu–Hurlin Panel Causality Tests 
        
Specification   Null Hypothesis: W–Stat. Zbar Stat. Prob.  
1 
GDP growth does not homogeneously cause debt 4.6265 6.0140 2.00E-09 
Debt does not homogeneously cause GDP growth 3.5252 3.0872 0.002 
 
        
 
We provide in Figure 4, a graphical analysis of the correlation between debt and growth 
in the debt regimes discretely. In the debt regimes: 0-30%, 31-60% and 61-90% debt/GDP 
levels, the GDP growth hovers in the positive level and tends to glide into the negative zone 
in the debt regime 91-150%. In the debt regime >151% debt/GDP level, the GDP growth runs 
in the negative zone demonstrating the negative relationship with debt level. 
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Figure 4: Government Debt and Growth in Debt Regimes 
This figure presents the dynamics of government debt and economic growth in debt regimes: 0-30; 31-60; 61-90; 91-150; 151 % above for the period from 1960-2009. 
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Table 4: Debt and Growth –  Regression Results 
This table presents the results of the regressions for understanding the effect of debt on the long–term growth of countries. Our dependent variable is the GDP growth. 
Columns (1), (2) and (5) present the results of the Panel Least Squares (PLS). Columns (3) and (6) present the results of the Panel Generalized Method of Moments (PGMM) 
(Cross–section weights (PCSE) standard errors & covariance). Columns (4), (5) and (7) present the results of Robust Least Squares. We report the coefficient values marked with 
significance levels in the first row followed by the standard errors (in the parenthesis) in the second row. Asterisks ***, ** indicate levels of significance at 1%, and 5% respectively. 
 
 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
  Eqn. (2) Eqn. (3) PLS Eqn. (3) PGMM Eqn. (4) RLS Eqn. (5) PLS Eqn. (5) PGMM Eqn. (5) RLS 
Explanatory Variables Mean (Std. Dev.) Linear models Non–linear models 
General government gross 
debt (Debt) 
56.116 (56.46) 
-0.014*** -0.003* -0.003* -0.002*** -0.013*** -0.023*** -0.0079*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.005) (0.0025) 
Debt Sq. 3912 (31139)     
0.0000178 0.0000466** 1.24E-05** 
    
(0.0000166) (0.0000210) (1.06E-05) 
GDPGR(-1) 3.8542 (5.49)  
0.218*** 0.218*** 0.261*** 0.306*** 0.189*** 0.249*** 
 
(0.018) (0.029) (0.011) (0.018) (0.028) (0.011) 
Gross fixed capital formation 5.8572 (42.10)  
0.015*** 0.015*** 0.181*** 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.181*** 
 
(0.002) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.0009) 
Government expenditure 4.6668 (18.54)  
0.013*** 0.013** 0.015*** 0.040*** 0.033*** 0.017*** 
 
(0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.006) (0.008) (0.003) 
Trade Openness 72.892 (51.74)  
0.001 0.001 0.005*** 0.002 0.004 0.005 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.002) (0.005) (0.001) 
Final consumption 
expenditure 
81.241 (13.71)  
-0.069*** -0.069*** -0.012*** -0.019*** -0.063*** -0.011*** 
 
(0.014) (0.016) (0.004) (0.006) (0.016) (0.004) 
Foreign direct investment 2.7357 (4.62)  
0.061*** 0.059*** -0.003 0.063*** 0.053** -0.0019** 
 
(0.020) (0.022) (0.011) (0.018) (0.021) (0.0114) 
Population growth 1.6975 (1.22)    
0.198*** 0.292*** 0.126 0.223 
   
(0.042) (0.067) (0.218) (0.042) 
Inflation 45.131 (552.47)    
-0.0001* -0.0003*** -0.0003** -0.00075** 
   
(0.0001) (0.0001) 0.0001 (7.41E-05) 
Intercept  
4.682*** 8.128*** 8.140*** 2.259*** 3.732*** 8.197*** 2.468*** 
(0.109) (1.254) (1.389) (0.341) (0.544) (1.526) (0.346) 
R-squared  0.179 0.293 0.292 0.350 0.219 0.308 0.35545 
Obs  3607 2643 2640 2640 2621 2621 2621 
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 We discuss the results of the econometric analysis of the debt–growth relationship 
encompassing the econometric specifications for (a) testing the bivariate relationship as 
modelled in Eqn. (2); (b) testing the linear relationship as modelled in Eqn. (3); (c) testing the 
augmented Solow growth model in Eqn. (4); and (d) testing for nonlinearity as modelled in 
Eqn. (5). Table 4 presents the results of the analyses. As observed in other studies as well, 
simple bivariate panel regression reveals a negative relation between growth and government 
debt. Though the coefficient is always negative, its size is mostly not substantial in economic 
terms. The point estimates of the range of econometric specifications suggest that a 10–
percentage point increase in the debt–to–GDP ratio is associated with 2 to 23 basis points 
reduction of average growth.  
 
 Our results are comparable to the estimates of Kumar and Woo (2010) and Égert Balázs 
(2015) for advanced and emerging economies over almost four decades
3
. Studying a sample 
of 17 OECD countries, Panizza and Presbitero (2014) observe that a 10–percentage point 
increase in the debt–to–GDP ratio is associated with an 18 basis point decline in average 
growth.  
 
4. Decomposing the Cause and Effect Relationship  
In this section, we decompose the cause and effect relationship between debt and 
growth and try to find answer to the question – Does high debt lead to low growth or low 
growth leads to high debt?. Our approach here is to study the macroeconomic analyses of 
debt–growth relationship by considering the interdependencies existing across sectors, 
markets and countries, and national economic issues that are required to be confronted from a 
global perspective. That is different channels of transmission need to be considered. A useful 
approach to dealing with interdependent economies is to construct panel vector auto 
regressions (PVARs
4
) models.  
 
                                                          
3
 Kumar and Woo (2010) report that on average, a 10 percentage point increase in the initial debt-to-GDP ratio is associated 
with a slowdown in annual real per capita GDP growth of around 0.2 percentage points per year. Égert Balázs (2015) 10 
percentage increase in the government debt ratio is associated with 0.1 to 0.2 percentage point lower economic growth. 
 
4 These PVARs seek to capture the dynamic interdependencies using a minimal set of restrictions. Shock identification then 
transform these reduced form models into structural ones allowing for typical exercises such as impulse response analyses or 
policy counterfactuals. PVARs are mostly suited to capture both static and dynamic interdependencies while treating the 
links across units in an unrestricted fashion. They easily incorporate time variations in the coefficients and account for cross 
sectional dynamic heterogeneities. They are a powerful tool to address interesting policy questions related e.g. to the 
transmission of shocks across borders. 
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The model 
Our PVAR has almost the same structure as VAR models in the sense that all variables 
are assumed to be endogenous and interdependent, but we add a cross sectional dimension to 
the expression. Let us consider that Y t is the stacked version of yit being the vector of G 
variables where for each country of   Ntttt yyyeiNi Y ,......,.,.,,.....1 21 . Accordingly, 
our PVAR specification is  
    uYAAy ittiiit lt  10    Ni ,....,1    Tt ,.....,1     ------ Eqn (1) 
 
The subscripts i and t denote country and year, respectively. uit is a 1G vector of random 
disturbances and as the notation suggests,  tA i0  and Ai depend on the country.  tA i0  is a 
country specific fixed effect intercept term. Thus, Eqn (1) includes constants, seasonal 
dummies and deterministic polynomial in time. The coefficient matrix Ai  and the covariance 
matrix of the residuals are assumed as homogeneous. With this assumption, we estimate the 
pooled estimates of Ai that can be used to compute the impulse-response (IR) functions. The 
confidence intervals of IR functions are estimated with bootstrap simulations. We impose a 
recursive structure to identify the shocks that makes the order of the variables pertinent. We 
also consider the PVAR in reverse recursive order as a robustness check to find out whether 
the imposed order has substantial effect on the results.  
 
 In order to test the robustness of the model, Autocorrelation LM Test is performed 
which reports the multivariate LM test statistics for residual serial correlation up to the 
specified order. We perform White Heteroskedasticity Test wherein the test regression is run 
by regressing each cross product of the residuals on the cross products of the regressors and 
testing the joint significance of the regression. The test is with both options of “no cross 
terms” and “with cross terms”. 
 
To analyse the dynamic association between debt and GDP growth, we compute the 
impulse–response functions from the estimated PVAR. We estimate the PVAR using the 
fixed–effects (FE) estimator. Baltagi, (2008) suggests first differencing the panel models to 
eliminate the fixed effect to the inconsistencies. Since our sample size is adequately large, we 
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go ahead with FE estimator. However, as a robustness check, we find the GMM estimates of 
the first–differenced model with similar results. 
 
 We use the same data sets as detailed in Section 2 and consider all the five debt regimes 
(0-30%, 31-60%, 61-90%, 91-150%, and >151%) as well as the full sample (including all 
debt regimes) for PVAR analysis.  
 
Table 5: Sample description for debt regimes for PVAR analysis 
Period DR 0-30% DR 31-60% DR 61-90% DR 91 & above DR 151 & above Total 
1960-2009 29 56 18 14 5 122 
       
 
 
Results 
 We present the impulse–response functions derived from the estimated PVAR in Figure 
5. The figure shows the effect of debt on GDP growth for a period of ten years after a positive 
shock. In the debt regime 0–30, the impulse response function of GDP growth to one 
standard deviation shock to debt reaches the peak level of 1.17% in the fourth year and 
gradually recedes. When we extend the period to 30 years, we notice the response touching 
almost zero level (0.04% in the 11
th
 year to 0.0006% in the 30
th
 year).  
  
 In the case of debt regime 31–60, the impulse response function of GDP growth to one 
standard deviation shock to debt reaches the peak of 0.86% in the third year and gradually 
decreases to 0.03% in the tenth year. When the period is extended to 30 years, the response 
continues to be in the range of 0.03% to 0.07% but never merges into zero.  
 
 Debt regime 61–90 has an interesting behaviour. The impulse response of GDP growth 
to one standard deviation shock to debt moves from negative zone to positive zone (-0.5% in 
the second year, -0.04% in the tenth year, 0.002% in the 16
th
 year and 0.03% in the 30
th
 year). 
In the debt regime 91–150, the impulse response of GDP growth moves in the range of -
0.32% in 2
nd
 year to 0.13% in the 10
th
 year. When the period is extended to 30 years, the 
impulse response of GDP growth reaches 0.02% in the 30
th
 year.  
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Figure 5: Impulse Response Function of GDP growth to Debt Innovation 
This figure illustrates the Impulse–response functions of GDP growth to Cholesky5 One 
standard deviation Debt innovation computed from estimated PVAR (Eqn. 1) in all the five 
debt regimes (0-30; 31-60; 61-90; 91-150; and 151 and above) and for the full sample 
covering all debt regimes. The dashed lines enclose intervals of plus or minus two standard 
errors. 
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5 It uses the inverse of the Cholesky factor of the residual covariance matrix to orthogonalize the impulses. This option 
imposes an ordering of the variables in the VAR and attributes all of the effect of any common component to the variable 
that comes first in the VAR system.  
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 Debt regime 151 and above experiences a distinct behaviour. The impulse response of 
GDP growth moves in the range of 1.03% in the first year to 0.04% in the tenth year. In the 
extended period (upto 30 years), the impulse response of GDP growth reaches almost zero 
(0.000038%). We also analyse the impulse response of GDP growth in the full sample 
(including all the debt regimes). The impulse response of GDP growth moves in the range of 
1.26% in the second year to -0.87% in the 10
th
 year. The above results suggest that the 
impulse response function for the effect of debt on GDP growth is dependent on the debt 
regimes and there is no uniformity of effect across the debt regimes. We notice a long–term 
effect of debt on growth. 
Figure 6: Impulse Response Function of Debt to GDP growth 
This figure illustrates the Impulse–response functions of Debt to Cholesky One 
standard deviation Growth innovation computed from estimated PVAR (Eqn. 1) in all 
the five debt regimes (0-30; 31-60; 61-90; 91-150; and 151 and above) and for the full 
sample covering all debt regimes. The dashed lines enclose intervals of plus or minus 
two standard errors. 
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 From the Figures 5 and 6, it appears that the negative relationship between debt and 
GDP growth is the consequence of the negative effect of GDP growth on debt, rather than the 
negative effect of debt on GDP growth. Thus, there is evidence of GDP growth having a 
significant negative effect on debt. 
 
Figure 7: Accumulated Response of GDP growth to Debt Innovation 
This figure illustrates the accumulated Impulse-response functions of GDP growth to 
Cholesky One standard deviation Debt innovation computed from estimated PVAR (Eqn. 1) 
in all the five debt regimes (0-30; 31-60; 61-90; 91-150; and 151 and above) and for the full 
sample covering all debt regimes. The dashed lines enclose intervals of plus or minus two 
standard errors. 
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We now present the results based on the accumulated responses. Figure 7 provides the 
cumulative impulse response functions estimated from PVAR for all the debt regimes and 
full sample. By accumulating the impact over time, these plots indicate the accumulated 
impulse–response functions of GDP growth to Cholesky one standard deviation Debt 
innovation. The results are interesting. For the debt regime 0–30, we find that a shock to debt 
has significant positive effect on GDP growth. The accumulated response of GDP growth for 
the impulse from debt appears to be positive in the long–run as we notice an increasing 
cumulative response for one standard deviation shock to debt (1.81% in the 4
th
 year, 3% in 
the 7
th
 year and 3.19% in the 10
th
 year). We verify the relationship for a 30–year period as 
well, and notice the response as high as 3.81%. Variance decomposition of GDP growth for 
the 10–year period in the debt regime 0-30 shows that upto 10% of variation in GDP growth 
could be dependent on variation in debt.  
 
We find that a shock to debt has significant positive effect on GDP growth in the debt 
regime 31-60 as well. The cumulative response of GDP growth (for one standard deviation 
shock to debt) rises from 0.75 % in the 3
rd
 year to a high of 2.17 % in the 10
th
 year. When we 
extend the period upto 30 years, the response continues to be upward (2.31% in the 30
th
 year). 
The results suggest that countries in the debt regime 31–60 experience a phenomenon 
wherein debt has a long run positive effect on GDP growth. Variance decomposition of GDP 
growth for the 10–year period in the debt regime 31-60 shows that upto 4.39% of variation in 
GDP growth could be explained by variation in debt. We notice an interesting behaviour of 
GDP growth towards debt shock in the case of debt regime 61–90. The cumulative response 
of GDP growth, for one standard deviation debt innovation at 34.40, hovers around a petite 
negative range of -0.04% to -0.14 % in a period of ten years. When we extend the period to 
30 years, the cumulative response hovers around the same tiny range of -0.04% -0.15%. 
These results suggest that countries in this debt regime 61–90 fail to generate significant 
growth response for debt shocks. Variance decomposition of GDP growth for the 10–year 
period in the debt regime 61–90 suggests that upto 2.16% of variation in GDP growth could 
be due to variation in debt. Debt regime 91–150 displays an interesting behaviour of GDP 
growth to debt shock. The accumulated response of GDP growth to debt shock continues to 
be negative upto the initial three years and traverses slightly into positive zone during the 4
th
 
and 5
th
 years and again moves back into negative zone from sixth to eighth year. When we 
extend the analysis for a longer period (upto 30 years), we notice the response of GDP 
growth (for one standard deviation shock to debt) to be swinging in the range of -1.6% to 
22 
 
1.62%. The results show that GDP growth has no straightforward association with debt 
during this debt regime. It is affected largely by other determining macroeconomic factors 
such as inflation, trade openness, gross capital formation, and foreign direct investment. 
Variance decomposition of GDP growth for the 10–year period in the debt regime 91–150 
suggests that upto 29.41% of variation in GDP growth could be due to variation in debt. 
 
In the case of debt regime 151 and above, the cumulative response of GDP growth 
remains negative for the first four years and then turns gradually into a small positive 
territory. During the 10 year period of analysis, we notice the cumulative response of GDP 
growth (for one standard deviation shock to debt) to hover in the range of -0.17% to 0.49%. 
When we extend to period to 30 years, the GDP growth response to reaches a high of 0.52%. 
Variance decomposition of GDP growth for the 10–year period in the debt regime 91-150 
suggests that upto 19.82% of variation in GDP growth could be due to variation in debt. The 
accumulated response of GDP growth to debt shock swings in the range of -3.53% in the 6
th
 
year to 1.45% in the 9
th
 year for the full sample including all debt regimes. Variance 
decomposition of GDP growth for the 10–year period for the full sample suggests that upto 
40.04% of variation in GDP growth could be due to variation in debt.  
 
 This analysis has thus provided useful insights about debt dynamics in debt regime 
groupings: 0-30%, 31-60%, 61-90%, 91-150%, and >151% comparable to Reinhart & Rogoff 
groupings based on average debt/GDP levels. The mean GDP growth rates are DR 0-30: 
5.06%; DR 31-60: 3.79%; DR 31-60: 2.71%; DR 91-150: 1.86%; and DR 151 and above -
1.08%. Countries in DR 0-30 experience a rising trend of debt. It suggests that in these 
countries with debt (mean 27.15, median 27.79) has a positive effect on economic growth. 
Countries in DR 31-60 experience a flat trend of debt (mean 58.29, median 45), suggesting 
that, countries reach their optimum gains for boosting their economic growth at this level of 
debt. Countries in DR 61-90 with debt (mean 80.08, median 82.87) on the other hand 
experience a gentle declining trend. It shows that countries tend to experience no incremental 
gains from debt and perhaps approaching their debt thresholds. Countries in DR 91-150 with 
debt (mean 115.50, median 116.51) show a downward trend suggesting that most of them 
might have hit their debt thresholds. Finally, countries in DR 151 & above with debt (mean 
176.75, median 160.99), experience a sweeping downward growth indicating the negative 
effects of excess debt.   
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Our results derived from PVAR estimations clearly show the evidence of effect of debt 
on economic growth. Therefore, our results do not concur with the conclusion of Lof and 
Malinen (2014) that there is no evidence of for a robust effect of debt on growth, even for 
higher levels of debt in their analysis of 20 developed countries. Our results also indicate that 
the effect is not uniform for all countries, but mostly depends on the debt regimes and other 
important macroeconomic variables such as inflation, trade openness, general government 
final consumption expenditure and foreign direct investment.    
 
5. Conclusion 
 This study has presented a thorough data–rich analysis of the dynamics of government 
debt and economic growth for a longer period 1960–2009, as it spans across different debt 
regimes and involves a worldwide sample of countries that is more representative. The 
sources on which the study draws are more authentic and well accepted. We do not claim that 
the results are infallible, but do state that they are based on widely accepted econometric tools 
and techniques besides based on sound economic logic. One of the contributions of this study 
is that it is the first of its kind in providing a meticulous analysis of debt–growth nexus 
supported with a VAR analysis. The study provides an original analysis of the debt and 
growth beyond the popular discourse mostly surrounding the advanced countries.  This study 
observes a negative relationship between government debt and growth. The point estimates of 
the range of econometric specifications suggest a 10–percentage point increase in the debt–
to–GDP ratio, which is associated with 2 to 23 basis point reduction in average growth. Our 
results establish the nonlinear relationship between debt and growth.   The study answers the 
question – Does high debt lead to low growth or low growth leads to high debt? by providing 
an analysis of the decomposition of cause and effect relationship between debt and growth. 
The panel vector auto regressions (PVAR) approach was used to study the macroeconomic 
analyses of debt–growth relationship by considering the interdependences existing across 
sectors, markets and countries, and national economic issues. The results derived from the 
impulse–response functions and variance decomposition suggest the evidence of long–term 
effect of debt on economic growth. The results indicate that the effect is not uniform for all 
countries, but depends mostly on the debt regimes and other important macroeconomic 
variables such as inflation, trade openness, general government final consumption 
expenditure and foreign direct investment.  
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Appendices 
Annexure 1: Countries covered in Debt Regime groupings 
1 DR 0-30 (21) 
Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Botswana, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Rep., Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Guatemala, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Namibia, 
Norway, Oman, Paraguay, Romania, Slovenia, and Thailand. 
2 DR 31-60 (31) 
Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador,  
El Salvador, France, Ghana, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Japan, Kenya, Malaysia, 
Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, South Africa, 
Spain, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, and 
Venezuela, RB. 
3 DR 61-90 (22) 
Algeria, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Egypt, Arab Rep., Egypt, Arab Rep., 
Greece, Ireland, Panama, and Singapore. 
4 DR 91-150 (8) 
Belgium, Burundi, Central African Republic, Honduras, Italy, Jamaica, Jordan, 
Kyrgyz Republic, Madagascar, Nigeria, Seychelles, Sri Lanka, and Tajikistan. 
5 DR 151 and above (5) Congo, Dem. Rep., Cyprus, Malta, Nicaragua, and Zambia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
